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Democratizing deliberative systems
John Parkinson
Deliberation occurs in many different kinds of social system; but not all 
deliberative systems are democratic. Deliberation might occur in enclaves 
that are cut off from formal decision-makers; it might occur within a lim-
ited elite; and the inputs into elite deliberation might be technical-legal 
ones rather than the reflective preferences of those affected.
As Papadopoulos emphasizes in the Chapter 6, deliberation is just one 
value among several that drive modern governance. Even if the formal 
institutions of government are reasonably democratic, there are other sys-
tems of power that can pull in different directions and that are resistant 
to democratic control: the judicial system, the administrative system, the 
economic system, and so on.
Furthermore, there may be features of the systemic account of deliber-
ation that weaken its democratic credentials – that weaken the ability of 
the demos to fight back against economic, technical, or juridical power. 
For example, if Chambers (Chapter 3) is right, and social science surveys 
can count as valid inputs in a deliberative system, then how do real, flesh 
and blood people get their voices heard? If the processes by which a sys-
tem gives voice to its citizens becomes yet another preserve of technical 
experts, then public debates can become battles over who possesses the 
right technology rather than the substantive merits of cases made in less 
technically sophisticated ways (Mort et al. 1996; Parkinson 2004). In such 
settings, public participation can easily become passive rather than active, 
the result of a random selection process or a privilege bestowed by the 
powerful, not a right that one can claim against the powerful (cf. Cooke 
and Kothari 2001; Gaventa 2006).
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This would be ironic indeed. As was pointed out in the introduction, 
one of the key motivations behind the systemic turn in deliberative the-
ory is to put the democracy back into deliberation because of concerns 
about the democratic possibilities of isolated minipublics both in principle 
and in practice in modern technocratic states. Indeed, it has been thought 
for some time now that the deliberative and democratic desiderata pull in 
opposite directions, with deliberative criteria being maximized in small-
scale settings and the democratic being maximized in large. While Goodin 
and Dryzek (2006) have been cited as frequently presenting reasons to be 
cheerful, Papadopoulos presents a more complex picture in which deliber-
ation becomes yet another tool for exclusion. This book has been focused 
on rethinking the deliberative criteria to see how they can be made to work 
at the large scale. But we should not just assume that the democratic cri-
teria hold too.
The aim of this concluding chapter is, therefore, to ask whether it really 
makes sense to speak not just of macro deliberation, but of macro delibera-
tive democracy. It analyses this question in two broad themes – democra-
tizing rationality and the question of decisiveness – and while it focuses on 
the answers that the volume’s contributors provide, it does not restrict itself 
to those. Along the way, it raises four caveats to do with the way that delib-
erative systems are likely to work in context, especially the context of the 
states under the influence of Papadopoulos’s administrative imperatives, 
features of mediatized communication systems, changes in the nature of 
citizenship, and two political features that still should play more of a role in 
deliberative scholarship than they often do: power and interests. The ana-
lysis gives cautious support for the idea that a democratic deliberative sys-
tem is workable in principle, but with some important specifications about 
procedures. Whether the empirical objections can be overcome is another 
matter, and the chapter ends with a call to analytic and empirical action.
The conclusions are ones that echo this volume’s overall pluralism: 
there are many different possible configurations of sites, actors, and roles 
that will achieve deliberatively democratic outcomes, but ‘many different’ 
is not the same as saying ‘infinite’. What is recommended here is what I 
call a ‘stepped pluralism’, coupled to a fluid, relationship-based account 
of representation, more demanding criteria for deliberative justification at 
the empowered end of deliberative systems, institutional referees, and a 
central role for decisiveness.
Public reason and equal treatment
The purpose of a deliberative system remains to place public reasoning at 
the heart of politics, although what public reason demands has changed in 
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important ways over the last decade of deliberative scholarship. Christiano 
(Chapter 2) pushes the hardest line on this point, arguing that the pur-
pose of a deliberative system is to produce epistemically better outcomes, 
and the best means to achieve that is to have a division of labour between 
experts and citizens: citizens providing the basic aims of society and experts 
debating the means. However, citizens’ legitimate concerns are often about 
means, not just ends. Citizens very often agree that they do not want riots 
and looting in the streets, to take an example highly salient in the UK at 
the time of writing, but disagree passionately about the means to achieve 
those ends, partly on the basis of their differing experiences. To rule those 
views out of bounds would be to rule out much of what citizens want to say 
and want to be heard in a deliberative system, limiting their empowered 
communication in unjustifiable ways. Thus a more expansive view of what 
makes a system democratic includes the extent that it is sensitive to all that 
is said in the public sphere. Whether that makes it deliberative is another 
question, but that is the heart of the issue: can a system be both deliberative 
and democratic in more than Christiano’s limited sense?
An alternative approach starts by distinguishing between modes of 
reasoning, such as Chambers (2005: 207) who draws a line between the 
Socratic ratiocination of philosophers and Supreme Court justices on the 
one hand, and the public reason giving embodied in the publicity prin-
ciple on the other, a distinction that Chambers labels ‘public reason’ ver-
sus ‘public reason’ (original emphasis). Still others focus on the narrative 
forms of deliberation, the primary mode that deliberators use in the real 
world: telling stories, helping others feel what it is to be in another’s shoes, 
and making public claims on the basis of those experiences.1 Public rea-
son, in this sense, is not about achieving universal objectivity; it is about 
figuring out what to do at a given moment for a given people with particu-
lar concerns, experiences, desires, and preferences, things that Bohman 
(Chapter 4) bundles into the label ‘perspectives’. Public reasoning should 
still include reason-giving – the justification and probing of reasons behind 
proposals – but these reasons are often couched in terms of lessons drawn 
from lived experience and must be offered in terms that others can accept 
before they can be taken as determinative (Niemeyer 2011). Thus delibera-
tive scholarship has come full circle, returning to Habermas’s more socio-
logical concerns in Between Facts and Norms (1996) after spending some 
time focused on more technical issues of institutional design and the ana-
lysis of contained moments of decision-making.
This loosening of what it might mean to ‘reason together’ is one of 
the critical intellectual moves that has allowed the deliberative systems 
1 Parkinson (2006a, 138–40), with debts to Rorty (1998) and Young (2000).
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approach to re-emerge. Walzer’s (1999: 68) criticism that ‘100 million 
[people], or even 1 million or 100,000 can’t plausibly “reason together”’ 
depends on a Socratic understanding of reasoning. For what I call macro 
deliberative theorists, millions of people can indeed reason together if by 
‘reason’ we mean narrating and claim-making in a way that is ‘decision-
oriented’ (to use Chambers’s term); and if by ‘together’ we mean ‘on the 
same topic’ and ‘in the same, broad communicative system’. An important 
objection arises: that by redefining public reason in this way, macro delib-
erative theorists have thrown the deliberative baby out with the bath water. 
If everything is deliberation, then deliberation means nothing any more, 
and contributes nothing to our understanding of democracy: deliberation 
risks becoming ‘directionless, or worse, pointless’ (Bächtiger et al. 2010: 
48). Now, that objection is clearly overstated in this form. The ‘reasons’ cri-
terion filters out a great deal of everyday talk (Niemeyer 2011), but it does 
not remove problems of insincerity and manipulation, so a modification of 
the objection still stands.
Chambers suggests that a way of distinguishing deliberation from mere 
talk is that the former needs to be ‘decision-oriented’, but that does not 
address the objection either. Instead, one might apply Bohman’s analysis 
(Chapter 4) to argue that the objection misses the point of the systemic 
turn. A system with a division of labour is deliberative to the extent that it 
increases the pool of perspectives, claims, narratives, and reasons available 
to decision-makers, and whether those perspectives are generated delib-
eratively or not is neither here nor there so long as the decision-makers’ 
processes themselves are deliberative – and this is indeed the line that 
Bächtiger et al. (2010) take, distinguishing between communication that 
is an input into deliberation and deliberation itself (see also Parkinson 
2006a: 171). Thus Chambers is right to argue that public opinion research, 
something that is not itself deliberative, can be an important input into a 
deliberative system if it provides a channel for the perspectives of those 
who have no other channel. Similarly, Mansbridge et al. (Chapter 1) can 
argue that the openly partisan and clearly interested play an important 
role in a deliberative system when they alert citizens to issues and increase 
the pool of available perspectives, increasing the system’s overall delibera-
tive quality, without needing to claim that this represents the sum total of 
deliberation in a system.
Here I want to raise the first of my caveats. In the real political world, 
decision-makers make decisions to trust others to come up with quality 
inputs into their processes, just as citizens do. Following MacKenzie and 
Warren (Chapter 5), those judgements are made on the basis of assessments 
about the participants’ motivations and competence. This has an import-
ant side-effect: perspectives that have been generated by more reliable 
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technologies weigh more in public deliberation than those that have not. 
Here, ‘reliable’ means processes that are likely to be free of the distortions 
of instrumental rationality that have long exercised public managers, 
including narrow self-interest and cognitive limits on knowledge (Simon 
1947; Papadopoulos, Chapter 6) – i.e. bad motivations and limited compe-
tence. Furthermore, there is a hierarchy of technologies, with unmanaged 
public discourse near the bottom, qualitative social science higher, survey 
research further up, deliberative minipublics higher still, and so on. Where 
economics, lobbying, constituency views, and party members come in that 
hierarchy varies by setting.
The result is that not every contribution to the pool of perspectives is 
treated equally. Contributions are sorted into reliable (good motivations 
and competence), unreliable (poor motivations and competence), and 
mixed. Indeed, it may be that the deliberative turn makes equality less 
likely in such a context: one of the reasons why some advocates of delib-
erative minipublics have been promoting them (eg. Fishkin 2009), and why 
the British government in particular took to minipublics with such fervour 
in the mid- to late-1990s, is because they promised a competent, disinter-
ested public voice rather than an ill-informed or partisan public voice.2
This is crucial. Christiano’s account aside, the democratic credentials of 
a deliberative system rests on the degree to which it includes all perspec-
tives equally (see Mansbridge et al., Chapter 1: xx). If deliberation itself 
introduces features into a communicative system that ensure that per-
spectives are not treated equally, then the deliberative systems approach 
is doomed to failure. The riposte to Walzer’s (1999) ‘reasoning together’ 
objection seems to include the seeds of its own undoing.
Bohman and Chambers both offer a normative way out. For Bohman, a 
good deliberative system is one in which there is a plurality not just of inputs 
but of kinds of input, and that those kinds are treated with equal respect. It 
is not that we should sort the pool of perspectives into a hierarchy accord-
ing to the mechanisms that generated them, but that we should (1) use a 
variety of mechanisms to ensure that we have increased our pool to the 
widest possible extent; and (2) that each perspective is then treated on its 
own merits. Chambers says something similar: she emphasizes the point 
that epistemic quality is not the sum total of deliberative legitimacy; inclu-
sion is important too, and mass, aggregative methods are an important 
way of ensuring full inclusion. MacKenzie and Warren, meanwhile, argue 
that it is crucial that, in their terms, there are both institutions of trust and 
institutions of distrust, and that judgements about when to use which are 
2 Harrison and Mort (1998); Parkinson (2004); Papadopoulos (Chapter 6). See also Hogg 
and Williamson (2001) for a critique of the ideal of the disinterested citizen.
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partly based on the features of the relevant publics: where a defined public 
exists on a topic, then it is right to consult that public directly; where there 
is not, then a deliberative minipublic can be used to anticipate the reac-
tions of publics to proposals.
At this point, my second caveat arises. The anticipatory role of min-
ipublics is greatly overstated, because there is no such thing as a perfectly 
anticipatory context. Deliberation in the real world takes place in a con-
text of power and interests (Shapiro 1999). The decisions and deliberations 
of real minipublics impact on established interests and preconceptions, 
sometimes significantly. When confronted by deliberated agreements that 
contradict their positions, organized interests react in three ways: by put-
ting forward opposing perspectives; by calling into question the motiv-
ation and competence of the minipublic, often by sowing doubts about 
such ‘quaint, think-tanky experiments’, as one senior UK government pol-
icy advisor once said to me in an interview (Parkinson 2006a: 82); and by 
applying other kinds of political pressure via routes to which they have 
privileged access (see Hendriks 2002, 2006b), doing end-runs around the 
minipublic. Likewise, the casually observing public – the great majority – 
frequently dismiss counterintuitive results of deliberation as the ravings 
of madmen. Fishkin (1997: 1–2) opens with exactly such a story about the 
town of Grandview from the movie Magic Town, in which deliberators 
come up with ‘such a preposterous departure from conventional opinion 
that they become an object of national ridicule’. It is precisely this feature 
of deliberative minipublics that the opponents of abolition of the mon-
archy used in Australia in 1999 to undermine confidence in the motiv-
ations and competence of a deliberative poll (Uhr 2000). MacKenzie and 
Warren acknowledge this problem (Chapter 5, xx), as does Fishkin (1997), 
but do not pursue its implication, which is that the anticipatory function is 
most reliable on issues that lack political salience. Elsewhere, I have argued 
that such a lack of salience renders deliberative minipublics less attractive 
motivationally, and makes them less likely to attract attentive publics (let 
alone the inattentive), robbing them of some of their legitimating power 
(Parkinson 2006a).
It is worth noting here that Bächtiger et al. (2010: 49) make a related 
objection to the ‘any old input + deliberation’ solution. They argue that 
rational consensus and sincerity are preconditions of deliberation itself. 
That is, it is the expectation that a rational consensus will emerge, and the 
expectation that one’s interlocutors are sincere, that motivates one’s own 
deliberative behaviour. We can apply this to systems thinking as a way 
of restating my caveat: if decision-makers think that the pool of perspec-
tives has been generated by those who are insincere or self-interested, then 
they themselves may not behave deliberatively. Bächtiger (2005) reports 
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evidence of this in a micro setting; whether it applies across settings in a 
system is an important empirical question.
Now, one response to this caveat is to recommend institutional arrange-
ments that minimize the ability of powerful interests to do end-runs, 
restricting the formal public sphere (Hendriks 2002; Parkinson 2006a: 
157–8). Likewise, Papadopoulos recommends coupling minipublics and 
empowered decision-making sites: not so tight that the former become 
co-opted, not so loose that they are ignored. However, that is not the rec-
ommendation that emerges from the other contributions. Bohman, for 
one, recommends institutional pluralism ‘in which there is a variety of 
overlapping and mutually checking procedures, each formulated accord-
ing to its contribution to the division of decision making and epistemic 
labour within the deliberative system as a whole’ (Chapter 4, xx; see also 
Mansbridge et al, Chapter 1, xx and Christiano, Chapter 2, xx on compe-
tition). However, that solution is under-specified as it stands. Once again, 
not all access points are created equal: some have more communicative 
power than others. In that case, what may be required is not just competi-
tive pluralism, but a set of strong institutions that are both connected to 
the broad public sphere and empowered to perform a scrutiny and check-
ing role – Thompson’s ‘tribune’, for example (Thompson 1999) – as well as 
the media, interest groups, and citizen networks. Just as it has long been 
recognized that formal, small-scale deliberation works best with a trained 
moderator (e.g. Dryzek 1987), so it might also be the case that large-scale 
deliberative systems require empowered referees to control the game.
In constitutionalist democratic theory this is the role of the courts, but 
again Papadopoulos’s objections are important here. In real-world politics, 
constitutionalism becomes judicialization, the shift of power away from 
the players to the referee and those with the resources needed to access 
the referee. Judicial judgements involve deliberation of a kind, certainly, 
but not the ‘public reasoning’ that was emphasized earlier in this section, 
and certainly not of an inclusive kind. Nor does judicial reasoning match 
Christiano’s democratic criteria: the judiciary is drawn from a very narrow 
slice of society, even taking the limited exception of magistrates at the bot-
tom of the judicial hierarchy in the UK into account. This highlights the 
normative importance of Christiano’s ‘groundedness’ criterion: in a demo-
cratic deliberative system, experts and institutional power brokers should 
themselves come from a broad base, sharing solidarity and overlapping 
understanding with other citizens.
Of course, it is clearly the case that these caveats and objections are 
mainly to do with the implementation of deliberative ideals in an imperfect 
world, and thus do not necessarily tell critically against the norm itself – 
although see Gunnell (1986) for a sustained critique of the separation of 
9781107025394c07_p151-172.indd   157 2/18/2012   6:30:20 PM
Joh n Pa r k i nson158
theory and practical politics. But it might just be the case that it is impos-
sible to make abstract judgements about what kinds of reasoning count in 
a deliberative system. This is the final possible response to the challenge 
posed at the start of this section. As Mansbridge et al. argue, partisanship 
and self-interest might be destructive of the deliberative system in some 
instances but constructive in others, just as numerous political theorists 
over the years have argued that some situations call for suits and sober 
miens, while others require throwing the toys out of the cot (Parkinson 
2006a). I, and I suspect many other deliberative democrats, feel somewhat 
uncomfortable making such a recommendation, because at the end of the 
day the deliberative movement, if we can call it that, is in large part about 
replacing power plays and political tantrums with ‘the mild voice of rea-
son’ (Bessette 1994). Not only that, but deliberative democrats, deep down, 
judge deliberative systems by their substantive outcomes as much as their 
procedures. Political legitimacy involves not just doing things right, but 
doing the right things (Beetham 1991; Chambers 1996; Parkinson 2003).
This points in the direction of refinement to this solution, one that 
comes from Fung (2005). In brief, Fung’s view of deliberation ‘before the 
revolution’ is that unreasonable acts are justified to the extent that political 
circumstances are unequal, and failures of reciprocity abound. In other 
words, talk first, but if one meets a stone wall, ramp up the pressure until 
one is heard, and feels heard.3 This fits with Chambers’s point: public opin-
ion is a valuable input into the deliberative system if – and only if – there 
are failures elsewhere in the system that mean it is the only way for some 
voices to be heard. So, a deliberative system is more democratic when it 
hears what (the inclusive) people say – that it takes their communication 
seriously – but that in an imperfect context it may (often) be necessary that 
people try different means of communicating, even deliberately disruptive 
means, before decision-makers start listening. It is yet more democratic 
when the decision-makers themselves are authorized and accountable, 
or chosen in a random way that improves judgements about good motiv-
ations and thus trust.
This is not a general, non-specific pluralism; it is a stepped pluralism. 
It has a default setting – reason together calmly, à la Bessette (1994) and 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) – but it also has different communica-
tion channels and modes appropriate to a given context, with referees 
and Christiano’s ‘groundedness’ requirement. It is also a pluralism with 
formal decision-making sites that are accountable, either electorally or 
3 Readers familiar with game theory will recognize the echoes of Axelrod’s (1981) ‘cooper-
ate, then tit-for-tat’ strategy in this formulation: first ‘cooperate’, but if the response is 
‘defect’, then ‘defect’ in turn.
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deliberatively (Roche 2003), to the rest of the public. This, I think, is one 
good response to the problem of democratizing reason in real deliberative 
systems. ‘Deliberation’ on this account still has some analytic bite – it is not 
all things to all people – but it becomes a means to an end rather than an 
end in itself. Sometimes non-deliberative means will be required in order 
to make the deliberative system as a whole more responsive. Whether that 
is a sufficient response will be seen shortly.
Responsiveness, determinacy, and communication
The word ‘responsive’ in the last section brings us to the next set of demo-
cratic challenges for a deliberative systems account. For some theorists, 
the democratic credentials of a deliberative system rest on the ‘responsive-
ness rule’ (Goodin 2003b; May 1996; Saward 1998). Christiano (Chapter 
2, xx) takes a variant of this line, claiming that a system is democratic 
to the degree that it ‘faithfully implements the basic aims of citizens’. At 
the same time, it has been a standard line in democratic theory that sys-
tems are democratic to the extent that public wishes are determinative in 
some way. If consulting public opinion is a merely formal requirement, 
but government action is actually driven by powerful interests, then we do 
not have democracy (Beetham 1994; Dryzek 1996; Papadopoulos, Chapter 
6). Furthermore, all the classic electoral definitions of democracy have a 
simple mechanism for handling disagreement: majority rule. While some 
deliberative accounts also have a determinacy requirement (e.g. Cohen 
2007; Thompson 2008a), others do not. Indeed, in the early phases of delib-
erative theory it was a standard criticism that deliberative democrats had 
no account of decision-making at all, let alone a decision rule, once the 
highly problematic consensus requirement was watered down or dropped 
entirely (Dryzek 2000). For some years now, most scholars have therefore 
thought that deliberative democracy must be a system of ‘talk, then vote’ 
(Chambers, Chapter 3; Goodin 2008).
But the deliberative systems approach throws this into question once 
more, thanks to the very moves it makes to open up what counts as rea-
soning together. In electoral democracy, the link between citizens’ pref-
erences and electoral decisions is relatively direct: although mediated by 
the party and electoral systems, voters’ choices determine the outcome. 
In classic deliberative democracy, citizens’ preferences are constructed in 
deliberation – they do not pre-exist it – and so the idea that there is a gap 
between initial preferences and outcomes simply does not arise (List and 
Koenig-Archibugi 2010). But in deliberative systems, at least as articulated 
here, there need be no direct link between citizens’ perspectives and out-
comes. Nor could there be: only a small number of citizens are going to 
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have well-formed and well-informed preferences on any given topic, which 
is one of the reasons why there is a division of labour and a need for institu-
tions of trust in the first place. The great mass of people are going to have 
bits of argument and bits of experience, many of which will compete with 
each other. Some participate only minimally, trusting others to do it max-
imally; some contribute only in the form of aggregate data in opinion sur-
veys; others may have come to conclusions in one corner of the deliberative 
system that are at odds with the conclusions reached in another. It is the 
role of decision-makers (elected, randomly selected, or self- appointed) in 
empowered sites (whether traditional assemblies or democratic innova-
tions, as in Smith 2009) to put the pieces together into a coherent whole, 
leaving out some pieces and reconfiguring others in order to resolve disa-
greements. So there is always going to be a gap between opinions and pref-
erences in the broader public sphere and the agreements that deliberative 
systems deliver a degree of indeterminacy about public opinion. Can the 
deliberative systems approach bridge that gap?
There are several different ways of attacking this problem. We might 
think that responsiveness is the right criterion, but that the system should 
respond to the common good, or to citizens’ expressed aims (Christiano, 
Chapter 2), or to preferences that have been ‘laundered’ in deliberation 
itself (Goodin 1986) rather than to perspectives or raw preferences. I have 
already distanced myself from the ‘aims’ formulation, and ‘the common 
good’ is not a terribly effective evaluative standard because in most cases 
it is something that is discovered or created in deliberation, not an exter-
nal, pre-existing standard against which we judge deliberation (Parkinson 
1999; cf. Estlund 1993). The laundered preferences response simply restates 
the problem – citizens need to be able to recognize the laundered results 
and, as already discussed, there are reasons to doubt that would happen in 
the real world.
Another response might be to extend MacKenzie and Warren’s (Chapter 
5) analysis and argue that responsiveness is the wrong criterion, and that 
trust is a better central principle. As use makes them familiar, citizens will 
come to trust that minipublics, minidemoi (Bohman, Chapter 4), or other 
small-scale deliberative processes are the right way to solve political con-
troversies, and so any correspondence between their wishes or perspectives 
and the outcome does not matter. What matters instead is that the system 
be systematically sensitive to citizens’ inputs – i.e. back to the account of 
democracy in the previous section. We should then want the institutions 
of a deliberative system to be organized in such a way as to give citizens 
good reasons for trusting decision-makers based on assessments of motiv-
ations, competence and, crucially, respect, adding to that institutions of 
distrust in which those assessments are carefully and publicly scrutinized. 
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But surely it is problematic to rely on institutions of trust in democratic 
contexts where trust in all sorts of institutions is declining (Papadopoulos, 
Chapter 6). One might argue that the institution itself will create trust; but 
trust in MacKenzie and Warren’s exemplars of trusted institutions – legal 
juries – is also declining. Although it is easy to forget this in moments 
of institutional crisis, it is not just the design of political institutions that 
is causing a loss of trust, but fundamental shifts in technology and the 
citizenry as well. All over the world, citizens are better educated, more 
informed, more critical, and less deferential. They not only have access to 
better information, they are themselves the producers of information, and 
are therefore much more likely to rate their own information processing 
abilities more highly than the abilities of those who produce what to them 
are counterintuitive results. It seems unwise to put all, or even a signifi-
cant proportion, of the democratic burden on institutions whose social 
and psychological foundations are being eroded.
Still another response is to take more seriously the ‘social decisions’ point 
made by Mansbridge et al. (Chapter 1), and this is a response in which the 
changing nature of citizens’ interaction with each other and with power 
is a positive feature rather than a negative. The idea here is that the broad 
fields of citizens’ decision-oriented discourse in the public sphere often – 
not always, but often – acts as a significant driver of and constraint on 
formal decision-making. Rae (2003: x), in his preface, gives an excellent 
account of how this feels from inside local government, which is relatively 
weak in the face not just of the usual array of interests, agencies, and repre-
sentatives but ‘“forces” as ineffable as popular culture – from its veneration 
of green lawns on quiet streets to its hypnotic fascination with firearms – 
[which] form part of the power environment in which city government 
must operate’. One of the clearest accounts of how these ‘ineffable’ forces 
can be democratized comes from Dryzek (1990, 2000, 2006), who uses 
examples of decentred, flat-structured, diffuse yet participatorily con-
trolled social networks to show how citizens can be not just the unthinking 
mass-generators of discourse but the reflexive, critical, deliberative crea-
tors of discourse. His normative yardstick for a democratic deliberative 
system is one in which agreements come about through the contestation 
of such reflexive discourses. Now, of course, Dryzek is not so naïve as to 
believe that all discursive contestation in real politics is conducted in this 
reflexive way; but he does believe that important strands of modern pol-
itics can be understood in this way, particularly the environmental and 
anti-globalization movements.
One of the traditional weaknesses of such approaches is that they lack 
a clear account of how that contestation is translated into acts of govern-
ance. Habermas (1996) has provided one such account, with his ‘two track 
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model’ in which opinions formed in the informal public sphere are trans-
lated into law in the formal public sphere by mediating institutions like 
minipublics, the news media and social networks, and automatically by 
virtue of the fact that decision-makers are themselves participants in dis-
cursive contestation. But this can mean that the precise linkages between 
discussion and action are opaque to citizens, and thus open to manipu-
lation by powerful insiders (Papadopulos, Chapter 6). Compared with 
aggregative processes, in which there is a clear story about how individ-
ual preferences are added together to choose governments; and compared 
with MacKenzie and Warren’s or Christiano’s proposals, where there are 
publicly visible sites for deliberation, discursive processes are much harder 
to pin down. It is hard to hold anyone to account for their actions and rea-
sons, hard to judge the presence of hidden agendas and interests, and hard 
to judge the strength of support for a proposal if there are no clear sites 
of power, no clear lines of responsibility and accountability, and no clear 
institutional boundaries.4
Dryzek himself has come up with a modest proposal for a transmis-
sion mechanism, the ‘chamber of discourses’, in which discourse rep-
resentatives are chosen by means of a social scientific procedure, the Q 
methodology.5 I am not a fan of the chamber of discourses approach: its 
highly technical selection method is too opaque to allow citizens to make 
good trust judgements. But there are many, many more options available 
than just that, and some of them are both familiar and fit the need for 
decisiveness. Most obviously there is the referendum device, which can be 
used to send precise proposals (rather than more-or-less vague problem 
statements) to the people for a vote when other institutions have not been 
able to reach an agreement. The referendum process has many anti-delib-
erative features, especially when used as an agenda-setting tool or when 
it is expected to reveal consensus among citizens that is lacking among 
representatives (Parkinson 2001, 2009). However, when used to legitim-
ate a course of action, they are useful indeed because of their broad fran-
chise and (ideally) decisive force. This is one of the features of the British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA) case that is not given enough dis-
cussion. Writers citing the case tend to focus on the Assembly itself, for-
getting the referendums that followed and all the communication that 
surrounded the decision over more than five years. And yet the interesting 
features of the case from a democratic point of view is that the Assembly 
made no binding collective decision; the decision was made by citizens in 
4 March and Olsen (1995); Savoie (2004). For an extended argument for the importance of 
single, physical stages for democratic scrutiny and accountability, see Parkinson (2012).
5 Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008). On Q methodology, see Brown (1980).
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two referendums, one in 2005 and another in 2009 (Carty et al. 2009). So 
while the BCCA itself was not decisive, and had no direct responsiveness 
mechanisms, the system as a whole was. Smith (2009) notes other benefits 
of the referendum device in a deliberative context (see also Budge 1996), 
along with several other ‘innovations’ which connect the informal public 
sphere with empowered decision-making moments.
Dryzek (2009) has also argued that participation in minipublics is itself 
a tool of democratization, because it builds the capacity to exercise com-
municative freedom and power (to use Bohman’s terms) in other spheres 
as well, a variant of the spillover thesis long advocated by participatory 
democrats from Pateman (1970) to Mansbridge (1983) and on (e.g. Gastil 
et al. 2010; see also Carter 2006). In other words, small-scale deliberation 
can have large-scale impacts not just in a formal, mechanistic way, but 
because it helps to create the very kinds of empowered citizens that make 
discursive democracy at the large scale work (Goodin and Dryzek 2006). 
Those empowered citizens then choose their fights in an active fashion. 
Thus democracy could be enhanced in a deliberative system not just by 
mechanisms that hard-wire linkages between the formal and informal 
public sphere, but also by a plurality of participatory institutions that 
encourage active citizenship – an active citizenship that demands respon-
siveness in a bottom-up fashion rather than a formal, institutional design 
approach that generates responsiveness in a top-down fashion.
This might well be right, but it cannot be sufficient. The same objec-
tions that arose with regard to radical pluralism in the previous sec-
tion apply again here. A final response is to have a more nuanced view 
of what representation in a deliberative system demands. Representation 
scholarship has recently undergone something of a revival and recasting 
after being stuck for many years in the highly influential but problem-
atic analytics of Pitkin (1967). From Young (2000) and Urbinati (2000), to 
Mansbridge (2003), Rehfeld (2005), and Saward (2010), representation the-
ory now emphasizes both ‘representation as relationship’, to use Young’s 
term, and the idea that constituencies are not fixed entities determined by 
identity and borders but are fluid things called into being by representative 
claims (see also Bohman 2007; Iveson 2007; List and Koenig-Archibugi 
2010). These two moves transcend the limits of traditional principal-agent 
thinking, in which the problems of responsiveness are cast as difficulties 
of identifying fixed, pre-existing constituencies and knowing what they 
want, and creating bonds of authorization and accountability such that 
representatives do those things. Instead, representatives call constituen-
cies into being by their claims – appeals to ‘right thinking people’ or ‘urban 
youth’ – such that citizens identify and engage with different representa-
tives on different topics in different contexts. This is both more normatively 
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useful and more empirically accurate. Empirically, partisan dealignment 
has been a long-noted phenomenon, with citizens supporting more spe-
cific causes, perspectives, and arguments rather than simply identifying 
with or deferring to party lines or members of parliament.6 Normatively, 
it helps us see responsiveness as a matter of mutual, co-creation of per-
spectives and problems between citizens and representatives, even where 
decision-making power is delegated to trusted institutions. The problems 
then become ensuring not that representatives do as they are told, but that 
representatives are grounded in and give voice to the wide variety of per-
spectives that might be relevant on any given topic (Christiano, Chapter 2; 
Young 2000: 148).
This view of representation helps reconcile the deliberative ideal that 
citizens’ views are created in deliberation with the systemic approach that 
creates a deliberative division of labour, because rather than seeing delib-
erative authenticity as being either a top-down or a bottom-up affair, it sees 
it as both, and shares the responsibility between citizens and representa-
tives. But we should not think that the problems of responsiveness and 
determinacy magically vanish in such a conception. As discussed in the 
previous section, and as Chambers insists at the end of her chapter, it needs 
to be remembered that sometimes raw opinion reflects ‘what citizens actu-
ally think, believe and care about’. This means that despite the best com-
municative efforts of representatives and citizens, there is always going to 
be some gap between demands and outcomes in a deliberative system. Thus 
while a revised account of representation means that Papadopoulos’s con-
cerns about formal bonds of authorization and accountability are probably 
overstated, they are not irrelevant.
Caveats three and four arise at this point. Number three is if delib-
erative systems theory is going to place the democratic burden on com-
munication between representatives and citizens, then there needs to be 
a very great deal more work done by deliberative democrats to under-
stand the channels of communication. In a complex society, the bur-
den of communication between citizens and representatives is going to 
be carried in three ways: face-to-face or one-to-one, in relatively small 
networks; via the traditional mass media; and via online social net-
works, some of which are large-scale, some of which are quite small. 
6 For a critical review of dealignment in the UK context, see Dunleavy (2005). This is not 
to say that identity issues are unimportant, especially when it comes to the recursive 
and rhetorical construction of identities: ‘right-thinking people’ and ‘patriots’, or ‘urban 
youth’ and ‘hard-working families’. Perhaps one blind spot of some new representation 
theory is that it does not take the performative and rhetorical construction of represen-
tation seriously enough, with the notable exception of Saward (2010: 66–70).
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Deliberative democrats have long recognized the limitations of face-to-
face engagement, although part of the point of the deliberative systems 
approach is to reactivate interest in the myriad conversations around kit-
chen tables and online that make up the informal deliberative system 
(Chambers, Chapter 3; Jacobs et al. 2009; Mansbridge 1999; Mansbridge 
et al., Chapter 1), while others have pointed out the benefits of delibera-
tive enclaves for subaltern groups (Fraser 1992; Sunstein 2002). However, 
deliberative democrats continue to present an unrealistically rosy view 
of both traditional and new media, treating both as perfect transmission 
mechanisms instead of institutions that have incentives and filters, like 
any other institution. The traditional media introduce systematic distor-
tions into deliberative systems: even putting aside ‘pre-revolution’ (Fung 
2005) problems with the political economy of news, their audience and 
narrative requirements, and physical features mean that the personalis-
tic, unusual, and conflictual dominates over the impersonal, the usual, 
and the harmonious, while much of the story that deliberative demo-
crats want to tell fall into the latter category, not the former (Parkinson 
2006b). This introduces incentives to focus on the dramatic features of 
an issue at the expense of the more mundane. Certainly the traditional 
media are good at conveying ‘perspectives’, and if that is all we judge the 
quality of deliberative systems by then the problem is relatively minor. 
However, that is not all we judge deliberative systems by: we also want 
them to be good at communicating reasons for agreements, and details 
about macro-political forces. This means that the problem is still signifi-
cant. Research on the deliberative quality of social media, meanwhile, is 
still in its infancy, with analysis focusing largely on micro-deliberative 
criteria rather than systemic inputs (Janssen and Kies 2005; Wright and 
Street 2007; although a partial exception is Hajer 2009). Again, there are 
reasons to be cheerful: citizen-journalists are now much more effect-
ive at communicating perspectives and telling stories that traditional 
media, for various reasons, do not cover well; or, as in the Arab Spring, 
set the agenda for traditional media, formal institutions, and informal 
deliberation alike. But there are also reasons to be extremely cautious, 
to do with the loss of civility that occurs online; the tendency for online 
communication to strip situations and arguments of their subtleties; the 
increasing technical ability of the powerful to restrict content and dia-
logue online, given the dependence of online networks on hardware that 
is outside the network members’ control; and the very proliferation and 
fragmentation of media that makes it relatively easy to reach particular 
groups but much harder to reach citizens in general without significant 
resources and without significant resources going into attracting atten-
tion to a story. This is to say nothing of the rhetorical, symbolic, and 
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performative tools needed to attract attention (Edelman 1988), things 
which lead unmediated public deliberation to be conducted in largely 
symbolic rather than reasonable terms (Niemeyer 2011), features which 
have led many deliberative democrats to be extremely wary of rhetoric.7
All this calls into question the ability of citizens and representatives not 
to talk but to be heard. Deliberative systems that rely on mediated commu-
nication might feature a lot of talk, but only a limited number of sites of 
talking together let alone reasoning together. The sites that do have desir-
able features might have a limited impact on the rest of the public sphere. 
Perhaps the best that can be hoped for in a deliberative system is that it 
uses lots of different channels, including a mix of face-to-face, small net-
work, social network, and traditional media outlets; and that at least some 
of that communication concerns the grounds of trust between decision-
makers and publics, as well as the substantive detail of an reasons under-
lying agreements reached. Even that stripped-down norm demands a great 
deal. To return to the BCCA case, evidence reported by Thompson (2008b) 
suggests that more than two-fifths of respondents to a pre-referendum sur-
vey could barely recall the Assembly, if at all, just a few months after its 
final report was released. While the Assembly clearly had an impact on 
the vote of those who knew about it, large numbers were untouched. That 
seems disappointing in a process that is frequently held up as a paragon of 
macro deliberation in action.
The fourth and final caveat relates to deliberative democrats’ great faith 
that deliberative processes result in epistemically better, procedurally bet-
ter, or just decisions. There is remarkably little empirical evidence to go on 
here – most of it is anecdotal at best, and even that which is not is gener-
ated in the rather limited, controlled environments of minipublics (Ryfe 
2005). Using that as evidence of the deliberative capacities of citizens is 
fine (Niemeyer 2011), and to be warmly welcomed. There is no point dis-
cussing deliberative systems if citizens do not even have the capacity to act 
in accordance with deliberative norms. But using that evidence to think 
that deliberative systems will have the same effects is just a mistake. An 
entirely different set of outcomes is possible under different institutional 
constraints (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010). Perhaps, having opened up 
normative room for many different sites and modes of expression, sys-
tems come to be dominated by perspectives that are narrowly constructed, 
unreflective or self-interested. Perhaps the powerful just exercise power in 
whatever way they can. Perhaps discourses that are generated in the right 
7 See, for example, Chambers (1996). Not all deliberative theorists dismiss the role of rhet-
oric, including Dryzek (2000, 2010b) and O’Neill (1998). See Parkinson (2006a: ch. 6; 
2012: ch. 2) for further discussion.
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way have no correlation with right content. This is something that troubles 
students of the Tea Party movement in the US: disaffected conservatives 
have borrowed the grassroots and online networking techniques of the pro-
gressives to forge a more powerful anti-progressive alliance (Williamson 
et al. 2011).
Summary: the criteria for a democratic deliberative system
Let me sum up the tensions and implications discussed in the last two sec-
tions before offering an in-principle answer to the question that opened 
this chapter.
The first major point is that the deliberative systems approach is based 
on a loosening of what counts as ‘reasoning together’, based on dispersed 
narration and opinion generation oriented to public decisions, and mak-
ing claims for public action or inaction. However, that loosening opens 
up room for trouble in real-world systems of governance. The normative 
vision calls for the equal treatment of perspectives, but introduces into 
real political systems a technical hierarchy, based on the very criteria that 
are used to make trust judgements, that ensures that perspectives are not 
treated equally. While the norm might seem attractive in the abstract, its 
effect in governance is to restrict greatly the sources that count and thus to 
impose its own kind of restrictions on the range of voices that can heard. 
It may even impact on the willingness of decision-makers to behave in 
accordance with deliberative norms.
Three solutions are offered, two of which are opposites. Most of the con-
tributors to this volume recommend institutional pluralism that encour-
ages competition between techniques and voices, while another approach 
is to insist on a carefully constrained formal public sphere in which delib-
erative norms are more strictly enforced and the number of access points 
is strictly limited, combined with what I have called ‘stepped pluralism’ 
in which it becomes legitimate to move away from deliberative norms the 
less one is treated with like regard. Perhaps it is no accident that those 
advocating the former are North Americans, used to a system of institu-
tional pluralism, checks, and balances, while the latter are Europeans and 
Australasians, used to a more structured, controlled institutional approach. 
Which produces better deliberation or more legitimate outcomes, however 
one measures those things (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010), is an empir-
ical question, although I have leaned towards the ‘managed’ approach for 
reasons to do with the resources required to be effective in a pluralistic 
environment. The third recommendation is to ensure the groundedness 
of decision-makers in the perspectives they are meant to represent and 
 adjudicate between.
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Whether equal treatment requires anything more than being treated 
with respect is another area of disagreement. While some kind of deter-
minacy in deliberation seems to be required to make it democratic, the 
deliberative systems move makes that very difficult. The discussion began 
by presenting the problem as being to do with the degree to which collective 
decisions fitted with citizens’ preferences. For the most part, deliberative 
theory conceives citizens’ preferences as constructed in deliberation, not 
pre-existing it, but the deliberative systems move makes that a more prob-
lematic conception: not everyone has their preferences transformed by the 
‘better argument’ because not everyone is exposed to all the arguments. 
Some participate only minimally, trusting others to do it maximally; some 
contribute only as aggregate data in opinion surveys. Mediated communi-
cation introduces further filters on what information people are exposed 
to. So there is always going to be a gap between what citizens want and 
what deliberative systems deliver, and yet deliberative systems need to take 
those wants – raw opinion, to use Chambers’s phrase – seriously, not just 
those generated by the most sophisticated technique.
A frequent response is that the system should be responsive to laundered 
preferences or the contingent results of reflexive discourse, but both of 
these responses recreate the problem – it is an empirical question whether 
citizens will recognize their inputs after the laundering or grant legitim-
acy to the ideas of those (relatively few) reflexive discussants. I think that 
unlikely without a great deal of change in the broader communicative sys-
tem. Another response is to argue that new institutions will create new 
habits, and that trust will emerge as citizens start to see deliberative forums 
as the right way of doing things. That presupposes a limited formal public 
sphere rather than a competitive pluralist one, outlined above – only the 
‘right kind’ of institution, such as minipublics or minidemoi, are likely to 
generate trust on MacKenzie and Warren’s account, while I have warned 
against relying too heavily on trust when trust in institutions generally is 
in marked decline.
The response that seems to work best is to think of good deliberative sys-
tems as being richly representative ones, hitched to a combination of direct 
and indirect decision-making institutions like referendums, minidemoi, 
and elected assemblies where appropriate. Representation should be an 
ongoing relationship based on flexible constituencies rather than a fixed, 
positional relationship between principals and agents. Representatives can 
be elected – and elected representation brings with it a kind of account-
ability that other modes cannot replicate (Parkinson 2006a) – but in 
deliberative systems representative roles can be performed by the self-
 appointed and the randomly selected as well, especially in settings like the 
international financial system where there are no formal, fully democratic 
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institutions to act as focal points. The key criterion for judging representa-
tives in a deliberative systems account is that they are ‘grounded’ in the 
experience of those they represent: that the ‘pool of perspectives’ avail-
able to decision-makers is broadly inclusive, and that the representatives 
themselves are diverse in their experiences. No one group of represent-
atives can do this, so a good deliberative system will feature a range of 
sites, a range of perspectives, and a range of communicative modes along 
with some public decision-making mechanism. Nonetheless, to maintain 
its deliberative character there should be a ‘default mode’ of reasonable, 
respectful discussion which, while having more of the character of public 
reasoning than the Socratic mode (Type II more than Type I, in Bächtiger 
et al.’s terms, 2010), imposes more justificatory demands at the formal 
end of the public sphere, leaving the relatively powerless free to try other 
means when they find their claims, arguments, or agency dismissed with-
out respectful consideration. To aid the powerless and increase the pool 
of perspectives there might need to be a macro deliberative moderator: 
perhaps Thompson’s tribune or some other kind of watchdog. Marketized 
media do not in themselves provide the necessary diversity of perspec-
tive (Street 2001). Whether the powerful should be given the same right to 
turn to non-deliberative means is not something I have gone into here, but 
the answer is probably ‘no’. One of the pathologies of deliberation (Stokes 
1998) is when the powerful circumvent reasonable processes in order to get 
what they want, and as Bohman (Chapter 4) argues, one of the purposes of 
a deliberative system is to empower citizens against powerful interests.
This account has many points of similarity with the more state-focused, 
formal deliberative system outlined in Parkinson (2006a). There is no need 
to go into detail here, but the present account is meant to be more broadly 
applicable to ad hoc systems that come into being to address specific issues, 
as well as to state-focused, formal deliberative systems, as well as to trans-
national systems and more. But it is worth stressing that both schemes 
meet the sequencing criteria that Bächtiger et al. (2010) propose as a way 
of reconciling the tight rationality requirements of deliberation with the 
loose requirements of democracy. They do this by emphasizing the wild 
public sphere as the ‘grounds’ of any democracy, giving a role to minide-
moi (noting Bohman’s distinction between that and minipublics) in the 
technical appreciation of arguments, a service role for experts, a role for 
representatives of all kinds in presenting perspectives, communicating 
reasons, and making decisions where appropriate, with the latter decisive-
ness function performed by referendums where necessary.
Given all that, I think we can answer the question of whether it makes 
sense to talk of a deliberative democratic system in the affirmative, at least 
in principle. How closely real political systems match this ideal is another 
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question, and the challenges of measuring the fit between theory and 
practice are considerable (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Bächtiger et al. 
2010). Focusing just on the issue of responsiveness and decisiveness, the 
key problem is recognizing when inputs have been treated seriously and 
integrated into the decision-making process. Bächtiger et al. (2010) back 
away from making the attempt, for good reasons, and argue for an empir-
ical approach that examines opportunities and procedures rather than 
examining whether there is a substantive gap between public claims and 
acts of governance, while recognizing that this is a relatively poor proxy for 
real influence. But part of the problem here might be their positive political 
science methodologies. Alternative methods exist, including discursive, 
qualitative methods, computerized network analysis, and so on – methods 
that may be more interpretive but need not be less rigorous. This is not the 
place for a detailed methodological discussion, however – that is some-
thing for future work.
Conclusion
I want to close with some general reflections on the application of the delib-
erative systems approach. While they did not say this in so many words, the 
authors of the introduction (Chapter 1) talked of the ‘larger goal of deliber-
ation’ as being to improve the legitimacy of democracy by making demo-
cratic institutions systematically responsive to reasons, not just the weight 
of numbers or the power of interests. The systems approach was taken up 
because no single institutional innovation can achieve that goal on its own. 
While the study of deliberation in parliaments and democratic innova-
tions has been very rich and rewarding, it has been increasingly obvious 
that all institutions do their work in context. Indeed, increasingly scholars 
of minipublics justify those efforts not just in terms of the effects on partic-
ipants or the rationalization of a particular decision-making moment, but 
in terms of their connections with other institutions and with systems of 
governance more broadly. While sometimes one comes across statements 
that equate deliberative democracy with deliberative polls or citizens’ jur-
ies, say, few scholars now justify those institutions in isolation. It is the 
impacts that they have – or fail to have – on binding collective decisions 
that matter. Because the failures have much to do with the broader sys-
temic context in which such innovations operate, it behoves deliberative 
democrats to look up from their microscopes and examine those interac-
tions more seriously.
It is clear that some branches of academic deliberative scholarship are 
looking up, and have been looking up for some time. It is not so clear that 
practitioners are doing the same. For example, a deliberation industry has 
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sprung up (Hendriks and Carson 2008) which, while having some fea-
tures that are broadly positive for the future of deliberative democracy, 
have some damaging ones as well. Not the least of these is the tendency 
to reduce deliberative democracy to a consultants’ toolkit of trademarked 
techniques rather than something grounded in the public sphere. In gov-
ernment, Papadopoulos alerts us to the fact that deliberation becomes 
just another tool of depoliticization, the attempt to take the politics out 
of politics and replace it with impersonal analysis, treating people as mere 
bearers of values with an uncertain grasp of facts rather than citizens 
with the agency and cognitive abilities that allow them to practise self-
government.
If deliberative democracy is a normative, emancipatory project – and the 
authors in this volume have certainly presented it as such – then such con-
siderations matter. The approach needs to consider not just the questions of 
how citizens might deliberate together in a differentiated system, but how 
that system is itself embedded in a political economy, in an administrative 
system, in a culture, in ideologies, power relations, and interests. It is one 
of the strengths of this volume that the contributors are aware of these 
constraints, although only just beginning to think through responses that 
are not just analytically satisfying, but workable in the real world.
There are three next steps. The first is to subject the framework to critical 
scrutiny, although I would caution against the view that finding contradic-
tions necessarily condemns the entire project to the dustbin. All our polit-
ical ideals have tensions; a tidy ideal is one whose adherents have forgotten 
something important, usually something human. The second task is to 
take up the empirical challenges that have been presented, deepening our 
understanding of macro deliberative realities and possibilities. The third 
step is to take good quality empirics and build them back into the theory.
One of two broad conclusions will result: the deliberative systems 
approach is hopelessly contradictory and utopian on both principled and 
practical grounds; or it offers a way forward both as a framework of analysis 
and as a practical vision of how democratic societies should work. This vol-
ume has, I hope, demonstrated that the approach has some analytic useful-
ness, although there is much work to be done to make that demonstration 
more robust. As for its success as a practical vision, it would be easy to 
make some wearily cynical remark to close, but that would be neither jus-
tified nor helpful. We already know that, even though Habermasian ideal 
discourse is an extremely demanding ideal, there are islands of rational dis-
course in the ocean of everyday praxis (Habermas 1983; cited by Bächtiger 
et al. 2010: 37). Even were the majority of real deliberative systems found 
to be not terribly deliberative nor terribly democratic, it might be that 
scholars find examples of reasonably good practice, all things considered. 
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Perhaps those islands are more likely to be found in small communities 
rather than the very large, or perhaps the opposite is true. Perhaps the 
state provides an essential focal point for deliberative democracy, or per-
haps states are too entangled with inimical powers to be as deliberative or 
democratic as other kinds of system. The point is, we do not know yet. We 
have an analytic framework, and we have bits of evidence. Now is the time 
to systematize what we know, and start filling in the gaps.
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